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Abstract
We study an economy where agents are subject to liquidity demand
shocks, and banks arise endogenously to insure consumers against these
shocks. In this environment we evaluate the desirability of a lender of last
resort who can provide liquidity loans to banks in distress. In the absence
of a lender of last resort, the economy has a unique, stationary equilibrium.
The introduction of unlimited and costless lender of last resort services al-
lows the economy to achieve a steady state allocation that is pareto optimal.
However, this economy also displays a continuum of hyperin‡ationary equi-
libria. We then explore restrictions on the provision of lender of last resort
services that rule out such monetary instability while preserving some of the
e¢ciency obtained by unrestricted lender of last resort services. When the
lender of last resort charges an interest rate on liquidity loans, the economy
has a unique steady state equilibrium, and when the interest rate charged is
high enough, no hyperin‡ationary equilibria arise. Finally, when the lender
of last resort faces an upper bound on loanable funds, there is again a
unique long-run equilibrium, and when the upper bound on loanable funds
is small enough, hyperin‡ationary equilibria are ruled out.
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As recently as 1961, Mundell argued that ‘‘it hardly appears within the realm of political feasibility
that national currencies would ever be abandoned in favor of any other arrangement,’’ [Mundell
(1961), p. 657]. Y et over the last decade, a single currency area was created in Europe, and several
countries have installed a currency board. More recently, some economies have begun considering
the possibility of adopting the U.S. dollar as legal tender, thereby eliminating the use of a national
fiat currency altogether.
Why are countries implementing or contemplating such drastic measures? Obviously there are
several advantages to joining a monetary union - even if unilaterally as is the case with ‘‘dollariza-
tion’’. First, abandoning a domestic fiat currency is a device to commit to low and stable inflation.
Second, it may reduce the costs and uncertainties associated with international transactions that in-
volvecurrency conversionandaresubjecttotheriskofexchangeratechanges. Third, supportersof
‘‘dollarization’’, especially in Latin-America, argue that it will eradicate excess volatility stemming
from speculation against a domestic currency. But abolishing the use of a domestic fiat currency
also entails considerable costs. These include the loss of monetary policy independence and the
lossofseignioragerevenue. Inaddition, thelenderoflastresortlosestheability toprovideliquidity
by creating money in the event of a banking crisis.
In light of these recent developments, we think it is opportune to revisit the subject of the de-
sirability of a national fiat money. Among the various topics mentioned above, we want to focus
on the role of a domestic fiat money for the provision of liquidity to a banking system in distress,
and we want to analyze the implications of such lender of last resort services for the stability of a
national currency. These issues are at the heart of the recent debate on ‘‘dollarization’’. As far back
as 1873, Bagehot argued that ‘‘in opposition to what might be at first sight supposed, the best way
forthebankorbankswhohavecustody ofthebankreservetodealwithadrainarisingfrominternal
discredit, is to lendfreely’’ (1873, p.48). This viewis widely accepted by contemporary scholars as
reflected in Fisher who states ‘‘there is considerable agreement on the need for a domestic lender
of last resort’’ (1999, p. 86). On the other hand, the existence of a lender of last resort has also
been identified as a cause for excess volatility in emerging economies’ financial markets, and for
1the currency crises that have plagued these economies in the 1990s
1. Thus, while there appears to
be a consensus on the desirability of a lender of last resort, the provision of liquidity services by
the central bank is also associated with the potential for currency instability.
In this paper, we take up these arguments and seek to answer two specific questions: (1) is it
desirable to have a lender of last resort that is able to print fiat currency? (2) does the presence of
suchalenderoflastresortaffectthestability ofacurrency? Toanswerthesequestions, weconstruct
a model with aggregate liquidity shocks that create a role for a lender of last resort. We show that
having a lender of last resort that can print money and lend freely to the banking system at zero
cost, allows the economy to completely overcome the liquidity shocks. Under this regime there is
a stationary equilibrium that is pareto optimal. However, there is also a continuum of non-optimal
hyperinflationary equilibria. Hence, while having an unrestricted lender of last resort allows the
economy to attain an efficient allocation, it also opens the door to currency instability.
Having identified the lender of last resort as a potential source of monetary instability, we move
on to a third question: (3) what measures could be implemented to eliminate the bad equilibria
associated with unlimited and costless lender of last resort services, while retaining some of its
‘‘good’’ properties and without having to eliminate a national currency? We show that this may be
achieved either by credibly committing to a sufficiently low cap on lending by the lender of last
resort, or by charging a sufficiently high real interest rate on liquidity loans.
We examine a simple monetary endowment economy originally developed by Champ, Smith
and Williamson (1996). It is a classic pure exchange, two-period-lived overlapping generations
economy, where some agents are lenders and some are borrowers, such that there is a store of value
roleformoney. Agentsareassignedtoeither of twolocations, andeachperiod, afractionof lenders
is forced to relocate. Limited communication prevents claims on specific agents from being traded
across locations and only money has value in exchange after relocation. As in Townsend (1987),
Mitsui and Watanabe (1989), and Hornstein and Krusell (1990), this generates a transactions role
for currency and allows money to be dominated in return by other assets. Moreover, in this set-up
stochastic relocations act like the portfolio preference shocks in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and
banks will arise endogenously to insure consumers against such random liquidity shocks. Thus,
banks write deposit contracts insuring lenders against the possibility of relocation, hold reserves,
1 See, for example, Chang and V elasco (1998), Mishkin (1999), and Fisher (1999).
2and provide intermediation between borrowers and lenders.
In this framework, we obtain the following results. In the absence of a lender of last resort,
the economy displays a unique equilibrium. This equilibrium is stationary, with banks holding the
same fraction of their portfolio in the form of reserves at all times. We show that there is a critical
value of the relocation shock below which these precautionary reserves suffice to fully cover the
demand for liquidity and to equalize the return on deposits for all agents. However, for realizations
of the relocationshockabovethiscriticalvalue, banksfacea‘‘liquidity crisis’’. Thiscorrespondsto
a situation of complete exhaustion of banks’ cash reserves and since other bank assets are illiquid,
this event precludes depositors from being fully insured. A wedge is driven between the returns
earned by depositors who are subject to the relocation shock and those who are not. Hence for
shocks above the critical value, the economy is not efficient.
When we allow for the unrestricted provision of lender of last resort services at zero cost, the
set of equilibria is substantially different. In this case there exists a unique steady state equilibrium
which is pareto optimal. Compared to the equilibrium for the benchmark case, banks hold a lower
fraction of their portfolio as real balances. They contract a liquidity loan from the issuer of fiat
money whenever they face a crisis and precautionary reserves are insufficient to cover the demand
for liquidity. By doing so they are able to fully insure agents against random liquidity shocks in
all states of the world. Relocated and non-relocated agents earn the same return under all circum-
stances and the economy is always efficient. However, in addition to the pareto optimal stationary
equilibrium, the economy also displays a continuum of hyperinflationary equilibria which are not
pareto optimal. In fact, in the presence of an unrestricted lender of last resort, the money supply
moves to exactly match the stochastic movements in demand for liquidity, allowing the economy
to completely overcome the stochastic relocation friction. This renders the economy equivalent
to a standard, Samuelson-case economy with a constant money supply [see Gale (1973)]. Hence,
having an unrestricted lender of last resort generates a pareto optimal steady state allocation, but
also opens the door to currency instability.
We then explore whether certain restrictions on the provision of liquidity loans may allow the
economy to preserve some of the desirable features of a world with unrestricted and costless lender
of last resort services, without permitting the existence of hyperinflationary equilibria. First we
study an economy with a lender of last resort that charges a real interest rate on liquidity loans
3to banks facing a crisis. When this interest rate is high enough, hyperinflationary equilibria are
indeed ruled out, and the economy displays a unique equilibrium which is stationary. Finally, we
study the case of a lender of last resort that faces an upper bound on loanable funds and show that
this policy can also eliminate currency instability as long as the cap imposed on liquidity loans is
small enough.
Before turning to the model, we want to point out some differences between this paper and the
existing literature on the lender of last resort. Obviously our model has a lot in common with
Diamond and Dybvig (1983). However, it is also different in several key aspects. Diamond and
Dybvig consider a purely real economy while Champ, Smith and Williamson (1996) have argued
that models of banking crises should be expanded to consider monetary factors. Thus we follow
them in studying a world where money has a role, both as a store of value and in the completion
of transactions. This allows us to examine the relationship between the terms of last resort lending
and currency stability, the central question of our paper. Moreover, the banking panics studied in
Diamond and Dybvig and the liquidity crises arising in our economy are of a very different na-
ture. In Diamond and Dybvig, private information regarding the preferred timing of consumption,
the presence of real assets that can be liquidated prematurely, and the imposition of a sequential
service constraint, combine to create the potential for self-fulfilling panics. These panics can be
ruled out by providing deposit insurance. In contrast, the liquidity crises in our model are the re-
sult of fundamentals, and it is the presence of the lender of last resort that permits self-fulfilling,
hyperinflationary equilibria to arise.
We also want to underline that we have abstracted from the problems of moral hazard and ‘‘ex-
cessively risky’’ behavior associated with the presence of a lender of last resort. Several authors,
including Solow (1982), Mishkin (1997) and Fisher (1999), have argued that these problems are
crucial in understanding the potential for instability related to the provision of lender of last resort
arrangements. In our model, currency instability may arise even when there is no scope for moral
hazard and ‘‘overly risky’’ portfolio allocation.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 lays out the model environment.
Section 2 describes equilibrium without a lender of last resort, while Section 3 presents the case
of a central bank that provides unrestricted lender of last resort services at zero cost. Section 4
looks at a policy of charging interest on liquidity loans, while Section 5 describes the behavior of
4aneconomy withalender of last resort that facesanupper boundon theamount it canlendtobanks
in distress. Concluding comments are offered in Section 7.
2. The Basic Model
2.1 The Environment
Weexamineamonetaryendowmenteconomyoriginally presentedbyChamp,Smith,andWilliamson
(1996). The economy consists of an infinite sequence of two period lived, overlapping genera-
tions, plus an initial old generation. There is a single, perishable consumption good. At each date
t = 0;1, ..., a continuum of agents with unit mass is born at each of two identical locations. Half of
these agents are ‘‘lenders’’ and the remaining half are ‘‘borrowers’’. The former have endowments
(!1;!2) = (x;0); while the latter’s endowment vector is (!1;!2) = (0;y): All consumers have
preferences given by u(c1;c2) = ln(c1) + ¯ ln(c2): We assume that ¯x > y holds, which implies
that thisisa ‘‘Samuelsoncase’’ economy (Gale, 1973) and hence there isa rolefor money as astore
of value in this world. At t = 0 there is a continuum of old agents with unit mass in each location.
Each of these agents is endowed with M > 0 units of fiat money, and there are no subsequent
injections or withdrawals of currency.
In addition to a store of value role for money, spatial separation and limited communication
will generate a transactions role for money in a way reminiscent of Townsend (1987), Mitsui and
Watanabe (1989), andHornsteinand Krusell (1990). Thiswill allowmoney tobe dominated in rate
of return by other assets. Indeed, at the beginning of each period, agents cannot move between or
communicate across locations. Goods can never be transported between locations. Hence, goods
andassettransactionsoccur autarkically withineachlocationat thebeginning of eachperiod. After
this trade is concluded at time t; a fraction ¼t of young lenders in each location is forced to move to
theotherlocation. Limitedcommunicationpreventsthecross-locationexchangeofprivately issued
liabilities. Currency, on the other hand, is universally recognizable and non-counterfeitable, and is
therefore acceptable in inter-location exchange. Hence the relocation process acts like a stochastic
cash-in-advanceconstraintfor young lenders. Theold-ageconsumptionof amover will beequal to
the real value of the money that she takes with her to the new location. The relocation probability;
5¼t;isarandomvariableineachperiodwithsupport[0;1];andisdrawnfromthetwicecontinuously
differentiable, strictly increasing distribution function F with associated density function f: The
relocation probability is identically and independently distributed over time.
Stochastic relocations also act like shocks to portfolio preferences which have the same conse-
quences as the ‘‘liquidity preference shocks’’ in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Hence they motivate
a role for banks to insure lenders against random liquidity needs. Banks take deposits, hold cash
reserves, andintermediatelending. Wenowdescribethebehaviorofborrowers, lenders, andbanks.
2.2 Consumers
Borrowers, who never move, face a gross market interest rate of Rt. They choose their quantity of
borrowing lt to solve the problem
max
lt
ln(lt) + ¯ ln(y ¡ Rtlt):





Lenders face a more complicated problem. Given that they are confronted with random reloca-
tion, they deposit all of their savings in a bank, and the return they receive depends on whether or
not they move and on what fraction of all young lenders move. Specifically, given that the relo-
cation status is public information, they are promised a real return rt(¼) if they do not move and
rm
t (¼) if they do move. Notice that, given our assumptions on the distribution of ¼, these return
schedules depend only on the relocation probability at time t, and not on the history of realizations









t (¼)dt]f (¼)d¼ + ¯
Z 1
0
(1 ¡ ¼)ln[rt(¼)dt]f (¼)d¼:
The solution to this problem sets




Hence saving is independent of the distribution of the rates of return. This result clearly depends
6on the assumptions of log utility and no old-age income for lenders, which imply that the income
and substitution effects of a change in the rate of return exactly offset each other.
2.3 Banks
Bankstakedeposits, make loans, holdreservesand announcereturnschedules. Weassume that any
borrowercanestablishabankandthatbanksbehavecompetitivelyinthesensethatthey takethereal
return on assets as given. On the deposit side, we assume that banks behave as Nash competitors,
which will lead them to choose deposit returns to maximize the expected utility of young lenders.
The constraints that banks face in this maximization problem depend on what lender-of-last-resort
services are available to them.
Below we consider four different scenarios. First, as a benchmark case, we consider a world
without a lender of last resort. We then turn our attention to the economy with a government that
provides unlimited lender of last resort services, at a zero nominal interest rate. Next, we analyze
an economy witha lender of last resort that charges a positive interest rate when providing liquidity
to banks. Finally, we examine the case of a lender of last resort constrained by an upper bound on
the amount that it can lend to a bank in distress.
3. No Lender of Last Resort
In this section we discuss general equilibrium for an economy in which banks are unable to borrow
from anyone other than lenders. We begin by describing the bank’s problem for this benchmark
case.
3.1 The Bank’s Problem
A young lender will deposit her entire savings d with a bank. Per young depositor, the bank ac-
quires an amount zt of real balances, and makes loans with a real value d ¡ zt: The bank faces
two constraints with respect to the return it promises to movers, rm
t , and the return it promises to
non-movers, rt. First, relocated agents, of which there are ¼t, must be given currency, since that is
the only asset which will allow these agents to consume at t + 1 in their new location. This is ac-
complished by using a fraction ®t(¼) of the bank’s holdings of cash reserves. Hence, if pt denotes






t (¼) · ®t(¼)zt
pt
pt+1
must hold. If we denote by °t ´ zt








Second, real payments to nonmovers, which occur at time t + 1; can not exceed the value of the
bank’s remaining portfolio – remaining reserves plus loan repayments. Since loans earn the gross
real rate of return Rt, this can be written as
(1 ¡ ¼)drt(¼) · [1 ¡ ®t(¼)]zt
pt
pt+1
+ (d ¡ zt)Rt
or
(1 ¡ ¼)rt(¼) · [1 ¡ ®t(¼)]°t
pt
pt+1
+ (1 ¡ °t)Rt: (4)
Of course, 0 · °t · 1 and 0 · ®t (¼) · 1 must hold.
Since ¼ is i.i.d., the bank’s problem is the same in every period and hence the optimal functions
rt;rm
t ; and®t are independent of the history of realizationsof ¼. Moreover, since there is free entry
inbanking, andsince banks behave asNash competitors, they will maximize young lenders’ utility,
taking deposit demand, d, as given. Banks will earn no profits, and constraints (3) and (4) will hold









































+ (1 ¡ °t)Rt
¾
0 · °t · 1
0 · ®t(¼) · 1:



























0 · °t · 1
0 · ®t(¼) · 1:
The function ®t; which is the fraction of bank reserves paid out to movers, is chosen after the
realization of ¼; while the function °t; the fraction of reserves in the bank’s asset portfolio, is
chosen before the realization of ¼: Hence we can first pick the optimal value of ®t for fixed values
















































pt+1 + (1 ¡ °t)Rt
(6)
Hence for realizations of the relocation shock below the critical value ¼¤, the bank pays out only
a fraction of its reserves to movers. However, when a relocation shock ¼ > ¼¤ materializes, all
reserves are paid out to movers, and repayments to non-movers are drawn from loan repayments
only. In other words, the bank holds precautionary reserves. When the realization of the relocation
shock is below the critical value ¼¤; these cash reserves are sufficient to equalize the returns across
movers and non-movers. However, when the realization of the relocation shock is greater than the
critical value ¼¤; the bank faces a ‘‘liquidity crisis’’. It pays out all its cash reserves to movers,
while repayments to non-movers are drawn from loan repayments only. In a ‘‘liquidity crisis’’, the
bank no longer equalizes the returns of movers and non-movers; movers receive a lower return.
This result follows from the trade-off between two forces. First, the return on holding cash
9balances is dominated by the return on making loans to borrowers. Therefore, everything else
being equal, the bank would like to minimize on cash reserves. On the other hand, in a quest to
maximize young lenders’ utility, the bank strives to provide insurance by equalizing the returns
between movers and non-movers for all realizations of ¼. To do so, it has to hold sufficient cash
balances. On the average, the welfare gains from equalizing the returns to movers and non-movers
exactly offset the cost implied by the return dominance of loans over cash reserves.
It then remains to determine the optimal value of °t: To do so, we substitute the optimal value































This formulation of the problem makes it clear that the return earned by both movers and non-
movers will be the same when ¼ is less than ¼¤; but will - in general - be different when ¼ is greater


















(1 ¡ ¼)f (¼)d¼: (7)
This can be solved for
2




This completes the solution to the bank’s problem when no lender of last resort services are pro-
vided. We now turn to an analysis of general equilibrium for this case.
3.2 Equilibrium
Anequilibriumof thiseconomy ischaracterizedby the marketclearing conditionsfor real balances
and loans. Since the supply of real balances, zt; is equal to M
pt; while the demand for real balances
2 To facilitate the refereeing process, we provide the solution method in referee’s Appendix A.







Similarly, from (1), the demand for loans, lt, is equal to
y
(1+¯)Rt; while the supply of loans is
given by (1 ¡ °t)d: This yields the following market clearing condition for loans
y
(1 + ¯)Rt






















which we can substitute into (8) to obtain the difference equation






We can now formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 1 When there is no lender of last resort, the economy has a unique equilibrium. This






< °a < 1.
The proof of Proposition 1 is presented in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. The proposition states that our economy displays a
unique, stationary equilibrium in the absence of a lender of last resort. Banks always hold the same
fraction °a of their deposits in the form of cash reserves.
Why is the stationary trajectory the only equilibrium in this economy? Suppose that the initial
pricelevel ishigher thanpa = M
°ad. Inother words, inFigure1, theeconomy startsonthepart of the
law of motion that lies to the left hand side of °a: Then the initial supply of real balances is lower
11than M
pa: For this to be an equilibrium, the demand for real balances has to be lower than °ad as
well. Hence the return on holding cash has to be lower than
pa
pa = 1; and the price level has to rise.
Sincethenominalsupply ofmoney isconstant, thisresultsinafurther decreaseintherealsupply of
money, which calls for a commensurate reduction in the demand for real balances and in the return
on reserves. Therefore, along a trajectory that starts to the left of °a; the supply of real balances
decreases continuously as the price level rises. However, in the presence of spatial separation,
limited communication and random relocation, agents have a strong preference for real balances.
Thus as the return on reserves decreases to zero, the demand for real balances falls to E (¼)d; not
to zero. For the demand for real balances to decrease below E (¼)d requires negative returns on
real balances, which is not consistent with equilibrium. Hence hyper-inflationary trajectories in
which the supply and demand for real balances drop to zero can not be sustained in this economy,
and the stationary path is the only equilibrium.
Notice that the equilibrium of this reference economy is not efficient since there are states of the
world for which the returns between relocated and non-relocated lenders is not equalized. We now
want to examine whether the provision of lender of last resort services will render the economy
more efficient.
4. An Unrestricted Lender of Last Resort
We first analyze the case of an economy in which the government is willing to make one-period
loans of currency at a zero nominal interest rate in any quantity that banks desire. After the real-
ization of ¼, a bank determines the real amount b ¸ 0 that it would like to borrow at time t – which
will depend on the realization of ¼ – and the government simply prints bpt dollars and gives them
to the bank. Next period, the bank must then return these dollars to the government, and they are
destroyed.
4.1 The Bank’s Problem
With such borrowing, the bank’s constraints become
¼dr
m








12(1 ¡ ¼)drt(¼) = [1 ¡ ®t(¼)]zt
pt
pt+1




Using our earlier notion for the reserve deposit ratio, °t ´ zt
d , and denoting by ±t ´ bt
d the liquidity
loan to deposit ratio, these constraints can be expressed as
¼r
m








(1 ¡ ¼)rt(¼) = [1 ¡ ®t(¼)]°t
pt
pt+1









































0 · °t · 1
0 · ®t(¼) · 1
±t(¼) ¸ 0:
Both the fraction of bank reserves paid out to movers, ®t, and the real value of the liquidity loan,
±t, are chosen after the realization of ¼; while the function °t; the fraction of reserves in the bank’s
asset portfolio, ischosenbefore the realizationof ¼:Hence wecanfirst solve for theoptimal values































0 · ®t · 1
±t ¸ 0:



































where ¼¤ continues to be given by (6).
For realizations of the relocation shock below the critical value ¼¤, the bank pays out only a
fraction of its reserves to movers. When the relocation shock is larger than ¼¤; the bank takes a
liquidity loan from the lender of last resort, and pays out all its reserves, plus the liquidity it obtains
from the loan, to movers. At the beginning of next period, non-movers are paid what is left from
loan repayments after the bank has reimbursed the lender of last resort.
We now proceed to solve for the optimal value of °t: To do so, we substitute the optimal values
of ®t and bt into the bank’s objective function so that the only remaining variable to be determined































+ (1 ¡ °t)Rt
¸
f (¼)d¼:
Clearly, then, the introduction of an unrestricted lender of last resort allows the bank to offer com-
plete insurance to lenders: Both movers and non-movers receive the average return. In order to

























The market-clearing equationsare the same asin the previoussection, hence equations(9) and (10)
continue to hold. Moreover, in equilibrium, we cannot have °t = 0, since then movers would have
zero old-age consumption. We cannot have °t = 1 either; since then borrows would have zero





must obtain. After substituting (14) into (9) and (10), the market clearing conditions simplify into







We can now state the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When there is an unlimited lender of last resort, the economy displays a unique
steady state equilibrium, °b = 1¡
y
¯x 2 (0;°a): There is a stationary equilibrium path for °0 = °b,
and a continuum of hyperinflationary equilibrium paths for °0 2 (0;°b).
The proof of Proposition 2 is presented in Appendix B.
The results of Proposition 2 are illustrated in Figure 2. The proposition states that the economy
with unlimited lender of last resort services displays a unique steady state, for which the reserve-
deposit ratioissmaller than inthecase without a lender of last resort. Moreover, thereiscontinuum
of hyperinflationary equilibria.
Why can hyperinflationary equilibria be sustained in this economy? Suppose again that the
initial price level is higher than pb = M
°bd. That is, in Figure 2, the economy starts on the part of the
law of motion that lies to the left hand side of °b: This implies a trajectory along which the supply
of real balances net of liquidity loans, °td = M
pt; decreases continuously as the price level rises,
and falls to zero as the price level reaches infinity. However, now the bank takes out a liquidity
loan, ±t; every time its reserves, °t; fall short of its liquidity needs. In the limit, the expected real
value of these liquidity loans is lim

















0 ¼f (¼)d¼ = E (¼):Hence, asthereturnoncashbalancesfallstozero, theexpectedtotalsupply
of money goes to E (¼)d, and this exactly equals the expected demand for real balances at zero
return. Notice that in the limit, the real interest rate on liquidity loans is zero, while the market
interest rate on loans to borrowers is
y
¯x: Thus, in an economy with an unrestricted lender of last
resort, hyperinflationary trajectories can be sustained in equilibrium. Indeed, in such an economy,
an expectation of inflation leads to a decrease in the holdings of reserves, which is offset – when
necessary – by the provision of a liquidity loan. This provision of liquidity by the lender of last
15resort, in turn, confirms the expectation of inflation. Consequently, hyperinflationary equilibria
arise as a self-fulfilling prophecy.
From the preceding discussion, it follows that the provision of unlimited and costless lender of
last resort services allows the economy to completely overcome the stochastic relocation friction.
Note that in the steady state, pt is constant even though the money supply is being changed every
period as banks borrow from the government. The money supply is being moved to exactly match
the stochastic movements in demand, leaving the value of money unchanged. In fact, the law of
motion (15) is identical to the one that would obtain if there were no relocations in this economy.
It is well known that the steady state is pareto optimal in this case, but that the hyper-inflationary
equilibria are not
3.
Therefore, we can conclude that the introduction of an unlimited lender of last resort may allow
the economy to attain a pareto optimal equilibrium. However, the presence of an unlimited lender
of last resort also introduces an indeterminacy of equilibriumand the possibility hyper-inflationary
equilibria which are not pareto efficient.
We now want to analyze whether the imposition of certain restrictions on the provision of lender
of last resort services would allow to improve on the efficiency of the reference economy, while
avoiding indeterminacies and hyper-inflationary equilibria. We first turn our attention to the case
of a lender of last resort who charges interest on liquidity loans.
5. A Lender of Last Resort who Charges Interest
We nowexamine thecase where the government continuesto make one-period loans of currency in
any quantity that banks desire. However, banks are now required to pay interest on liquidity loans.
After the realization of ¼, a bank determines the real amount b ¸ 0 that it would like to borrow at
time t – which will depend on the realization of ¼ – and the government prints bpt dollars for the
bank. Next period, the bank must return the dollars received in the lender of last resort operation.
These dollars are destroyed such that the money supply remains unaffected. In addition, the bank
must repay the lender of last resort brd in goods, rd ¸ 0. Agents derive no utility from the revenue
that the government earns from these interest payments.
3 This follows from Proposition 5.6 in Balasko and Shell (1980). See also Champ, Smith and Williamson (1996, p.
838).
165.1 The Bank’s Problem
Under this arrangement, the bank’s constraints become
¼r
m








(1 ¡ ¼)rt (¼) = [1 ¡ ®t(¼)]°t
pt
pt+1
















































0 · °t · 1
0 · ®t(¼) · 1
±t(¼) ¸ 0:
Again, given the timing of the bank’s decisions, we can first solve for the optimal values of ®t and


































0 · ®t · 1
±t ¸ 0:

































































+ (1 ¡ °t)Rt
: (18)
Hence for realizations of the relocation shock below the critical value ¼¤, the bank pays out only a
fraction of its reserves to movers. When a relocation shock ¼ 2 [¼¤;¼¤¤] materializes, all reserves
are paid out to movers, but the bank does not resort to a liquidity loan. Finally, when the relocation
shock is larger than ¼¤¤; the bank pays out all its reserves to movers, and in addition, obtains a
liquidity loan from the lender of last resort. For a given level of reserves °, the return to the bank
of holding money that it already has is
pt





per unit. This difference generates a kink in the bank’s opportunity set, which in turn generates the
range of inaction [¼¤;¼¤¤]:
We now proceed to solve for the optimal value of °t: To do so, we substitute the optimal values
of ®t and bt into the bank’s objective function so that the only remaining variable to be determined




























































This formulation of the problem makes it clear that the return earned by both movers and non-
18movers will be the same when ¼ is less than ¼¤; but will - in general - be different when ¼ is greater



















+ (1 ¡ °t)Rt












(1 ¡ ¼)f (¼)d¼; (19)







This completes the solution to the bank’s problem in the presence of a lender of last resort who
charges interest. We now turn to an analysis of general equilibrium for this case.
5.2 Equilibrium
Again, the market-clearing equations are the same as in the benchmark case, hence equations (9)
and(10) continue to hold. Substituting equations (9) and(10) intothe expressionfor ¼¤ inequation















Using these solutions for ¼¤and ¼¤¤ in equation (20), we obtain the law of motion for °t;
°t =
°t+1 + rd°t











We can now state the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Whenthereisalender of last resortwhochargesaninterestraterd ¸ 0onliquidity
loans, theeconomy displaysauniquesteady stateequilibrium°c 2 [°b;°a]:Whenrd ·
y
¯x;thereis
a stationary equilibrium path for °0 = °c, and a continuum of hyper-inflationary equilibrium paths
for °0 2 (0;°c). When rd >
y
¯x; the economy displays a unique equilibrium, which is stationary
with °t = °c for all t:
4 To facilitate the refereeing process, we provide the solution method in referee’s Appendix B.
19The proof of Proposition 3 is presented in Appendix C.
Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 3. The proposition states a very important result. When the
interest rate on liquidity loans charged by the government is smaller than rd¤ =
y
¯x, our economy
continues to display hyperinflationary equilibria. However, when the interest rate charged by the
lender of last resort is greater than rd¤, the indeterminacy of equilibrium is eliminated, and our
economy displays a unique, stationary equilibrium.
What is the intuitionfor this result? Why canhyperinflationary equilibria be sustained whenthe
interest rate charged by the lender of last resort is below the critical rate rd¤? To see that, suppose
the economy follows a hyperinflationary trajectory, starting with an initial price level higher than
pc = M
°cd. That is, in Figure 3, the economy starts on the part of the law of motion that lies to the
left hand side of °c: Along such a trajectory, °t approaches zero, and the expected real value of the
liquidity loan approaches lim





















¯xrd¼f (¼)d¼: Clearly, when rd >
y
¯x = rd¤, the expected real value of liquidity loans is – in
the limit – smaller than the expected demand for real balances at zero return, E (¼)d. Hence, an
excess demand for real balances exists even as their return drops to zero, and therefore hyperinfla-
tionary trajectories can not be sustained. On the other hand, when rd <
y
¯x = rd¤; the demand for
real balances can always be satisfied by liquidity loans provided by the lender of last resort, and
hyperinflationary equilibria may arise. Notice that in this case, as the return on cash balances falls
to zero, all deposits in the economy are lent to borrowers at Rt =
y
¯x while the lender of last resort
provides liquidity every period at rd <
y
¯x:
6. A Lender of Last Resort with an Upper Bound on Loanable
Funds
We now consider the case of a lender of last resort who faces an upper bound c 2 (0;1) on the real
value of liquidity per unit deposited that it can lend to a bank in distress.
6.1 The Bank’s Problem
For this case, the bank’s constraints continue to be given by (12) and (13). Substituting these con-
straints into the bank’s objective function (5), dropping the constant terms, and taking into account



































0 · °t · 1
0 · ®t(¼) · 1
0 · ±t · c:
Clearly, theupperboundonloanablefundscanonly bebindingforsomestatesifitsvalueissmaller
than the value of the loan a bank would take for ¼ = 1 in the presence of an unlimited lender of last




We will henceforth assume that this condition is satisfied.
As before, we can first solve for the optimal values of ®t and ±t; while keeping °t and ¼ fixed:































0 · ®t · 1
0 · ±t · c:


























































pt+1 + (1 ¡ °t)Rt
(24)
Hence for realizations of the relocation shock below the critical value ¼¤, the bank pays out only a
fraction of its reserves to movers. When a relocation shock ¼ 2 [¼¤;¼¤¤] materializes, all reserves
arepaidouttomovers, andthebankobtainsaliquidity loanb(¼) < cd. Finally, whentherelocation
shock is larger than ¼¤¤; the bank pays out all its reserves to movers, and in addition, takes the
maximum loan cd it can get from the lender of last resort. Notice that ¼¤¤ = 1 when c = ~ c; which
confirms that the program laid out above is only correct for c < ~ c:
We can now determine the bank’s optimal portfolio in the presence of a constrained lender of
last resort: To do so, we substitute the optimal valuesof ®t and bt into the bank’sobjective function:


















































































Hence the return earned by both movers and non-movers will be the same when ¼ is less than ¼¤¤;























which can be solved for
5
°t = 1 ¡





5 To facilitate the refereeing process, we provide the solution method in referee’s Appendix C.
22We are now ready to state the general equilibrium conditions for this case.
6.2 Equilibrium
The market-clearing conditions (9) and (10) continue to hold. Substituting these equations into the










Using the solution for ¼¤¤ in equation (26), we obtain the law of motion for °t when c < ~ c;





















For c > ~ c, the law of motion of this economy is given by (15). We are now ready to state the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 When there is a lender of last resort with an upper bound on loanable funds, c ¸ 0,
the economy displays a unique steady state equilibrium °d 2 [°b;°a]: When c <
y
¯x; the economy
displays a unique equilibrium, which is stationary with °t = °d for all t: When c ¸
y
¯x there is a
stationary equilibrium path for °0 = °d = °b, and a continuum of hyper-inflationary equilibrium
paths for °0 2 (0;°d).
The proof of Proposition 4 is presented in Appendix D.
For the case with c <
y
¯x, Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 5. When c ¸
y
¯x, the economy is
exactly like the economy with an unrestricted lender of last resort which is depicted in Figure 2.
The proposition states a very important result. When the upper bound placed on liquidity loans
is smaller than c¤ =
y
¯x, the economy displays a unique, stationary equilibrium. However, when
that upper bound is larger than c¤, hyperinflationary equilibria can arise, and the economy displays
an indeterminacy of equilibrium.
(Need to add intuition for this result.)
237. Conclusions
We havestudieda simple endowment economy in whichspatial separation, limited communication
and random relocation create a role for money which may be dominated in rate of return. Banks
arise endogenously in this world to insure agents against the liquidity shocks implied by random
relocation. This benchmark economy displays a unique stationary equilibrium which is not effi-
cient.
When we introduce a lender of last resort into this economy providing costless and unlimited
liquidity loans to banks in distress, the stationary equilibrium is pareto optimal. However, the
presence of an unrestricted lender of last resort is also associated with the existence of a continuum
of hyperinflationary equilibria that are not pareto efficient. Thus, while allowing the economy to
achieve a pareto optimal stationary equilibrium, the introduction of an unrestricted lender of last
resort also makes the economy vulnerable to currency instability.
We then show that these hyperinflationary equilibria disappear when the lender of last resort
chargesaninterestrateonliquidityloanswhichissufficientlyhighorwhenthecentralbankcredibly
commits to a cap on liquidity loans which is sufficiently low.
In our analysis we have abstracted from several issues that figure prominently in contemporary
discussions of the desirability and optimal design of lender of last resort services. First, we set up
the model in such a way that the provision of liquidity loans does not affect the government’s in-
tertemporal budget constraint. Y et the fiscal cost of bankbailoutsis aprimary concerninthe design
of lender of last resort arrangements. Second, it is often argued that the explicit or implicit access
to liquidity loans provides banks with an incentive to take on ‘‘excessive’’ risk in its asset portfolio.
Clearly, our model is not equipped to study this issue. Third, in many emerging economies coun-
tries, and certainly in those that are contemplating to adopt the U.S. dollar as legal tender, a large
fraction of banks’ liabilities and assets is denominated in foreign currency. Hence, the provision of
lender of last resort services, because of its effect on the money supply and thus on the exchange
rate, may affecttherealvalueofthatpartoftheportfoliowhichisdenominatedinforeignexchange.
This should be taken into account when designing lender of last resort arrangements. We plan to
address all these important questions in future research.
24APPENDIX A: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We cannot solve (11) explicitly for °t+1 as a function of °t; but we can derive some properties of
the implicit function. First note that when °t+1 = 0, which is its minimum value, °t is given by
°t = 1 ¡
R 1
0 F (¼)d¼ =
R 1
0 ¼f (¼)d¼ = E (¼): Thus the implicit function is not defined for
values of °t below the expected value of ¼: Next, when °t+1 = 1, which is its maximum value, °t
is strictly below one. Since the implicit function is continuous, there exists at least one steady state
for °: Moreover, at a steady state, (11) implies






We know F < 1 always holds; so any steady state, °; must satisfy











Hence for any steady state





















Thus °t as a function of °t+1 is always increasing and hence is invertible. The inverse function is
the law of motion for °t, and it is also strictly increasing. By the inverse function rule we obtain


















´ > 0: (29)
We can now evaluate the derivative of the law of motion, (29), at any steady state. Given (28) and
taking into account that the economy is a Samuelson case economy, which implies that y < ¯x, the
first term of (29) is greater than one for any steady state. The second term is always greater than or
25equaltoone, soforany steady statethederivativeitselfmustbegreaterthanone. Thelawofmotion
for °t must therefore cross the 45± line from below at every steady state. This implies that there is
exactly one steady state, whichwe will denote by °a and that thissteady state isinthe open interval
(E (¼);1): The steady state isglobally unstable, andall nonstationary trajectories eventually leave
the feasible region. Hence the steady state is the only equilibrium of this economy.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
The law of motion (15) starts at the origin, and is increasing and convex. The slope of (15)
at its origin is
y
¯x < 1; and hence there is a unique steady state, the value of which is given by
°b = 1 ¡
y
¯x > 0. From Proposition 1, we know that 1 ¡
y
¯x < °a, therefore °b < °a. The slope
of (15) evaluated at the steady state is
¯x
y > 1: Hence the unique steady state is unstable. Each
°0 > °b generates a trajectory that leaves the feasible region and hence cannot be an equilibrium.
Each °0 2 (0;°b] is associated with a trajectory that remains within the feasible region, and hence
there is a continuum of equilibrium paths. For °0 = °b, the equilibrium path is stationary. For
°0 2 (0;°b), lim
t!1 °t =lim
t!1 zt = 0; hence lim
t!1 pt = 1 and the equilibrium trajectories display
hyperinflation.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
We cannot solve (23) explicitly for °t+1 as a function of °t; but we can nevertheless derive some
properties of the law of motion for °t. First note that when °t+1 = 1; °t is strictly below one.














Clearly, °t = 0 satisfies (30), so the law of motion starts at the origin. Since (23) is continuous, we
can conclude that there exists at least one steady state.
However, °t = 0 may not be the only value for which °t+1 = 0. Indeed, when rd >
y
¯x then
there will exists at least one other °t 2 (0;1) for which °t+1 = 0:
















26Notice that this implies that for rd = 0;° = 1¡
y
¯x = °b: Moreover, we know F < 1 always holds:




























Hence, at any steady state, (28) is satisfied.














































Clearly, the law of motion is increasing everywhere if rd ·
y
¯x: However, when rd >
y
¯x; that is no
longer the case.


































1 + rd¢ y
¯x
h
(1 + rd)° +
y
¯x









¤) < 1 (32)





(1 + rd)° +
y
¯x












which, using (21) and (22), can be expressed as
¼








27But from Referee’s Appendix B, equation (38), we have
¼
¤¤[1 ¡ F (¼
¤¤)] + ¼
¤F (¼
¤) = ° ¡
Z ¼¤¤
¼¤







d°t j°t+1=°t=°> 1 always holds, and the law of motion must cross the 45± line from below
at every steady state. This implies that there is exactly one steady state, which we will denote by
°c. From (28) and Proposition 2, it is clear that °c > °b for rd > 0, while °c = °b for rd = 0



















































! 1; and hence (23) collapses to (11). Hence for rd ! 1; °c ! °a holds,
while °c < °a for rd < 1.
Given that the law of motion crosses the 45± line from below at any steady state, °c is globally
unstable. When rd ·
y
¯x, each °0 2 (0;°c] is associated with a trajectory that remains within the
feasible region. Hence there is a continuum of equilibrium paths. For °0 = °c, the equilibrium
path is stationary. For °0 2 (0;°c), lim
t!1 °t =lim
t!1 mt = 0; hence lim
t!1 pt = 1; and the equilibrium
trajectories display hyperinflation. On the other hand, when rd >
y
¯x, all nonstationary trajectories
eventually leave the feasible region. Hence the steady state is the only equilibrium.
APPENDIX D: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Again, it is impossible to solve (42) explicitly for °t+1 as a function of °t: However, we can derive





Hence for a steady state equilibrium to exists, it has to be the case that c <
y
¯x: [For c >
y
¯x; the
case of the lender of last resort with an upper bound on loanable funds reduces to the case of the
unlimited lender of last resort.]




E (¼) ¡ c[1 ¡ E (¼)]: Thus the implicit function is not defined for values of °t < E (¼) ¡
c[1 ¡ E (¼)] . For the uniform distribution, E (¼) ¡ c[1 ¡ E (¼)] = 0:5(1 ¡ c) > 0: [More-
28over, it is easy to verify that °t is strictly below one when °t+1 = 1]. Since the implicit function is
continuous, there exists at least one steady state for °:
Further, at a steady state, (42) simplifies to
° = 1 ¡
y





































which is solved by ° = 1 ¡
y
¯x = °b. Hence at any steady state, ° 2 (°b;°a) must hold.
In addition, note that the law of motion (42) can be written as
°t = 1 ¡
















To determine the sign of @¼¤¤
@°t , note that
1 R
¼¤¤
F(¼)d¼ < 1 ¡ ¼¤¤ since F(¼) < 1: Hence we have




F(¼)d¼ > (1 ¡ ¼¤¤ + c)F(¼¤¤) ¡ c: Moreover, for the case





(1 ¡ ¼¤¤)(¼¤¤ ¡ c): In addition, it follows from (24) that ¼¤¤ =
°+c
°+ y
¯x in any steady state. Hence,
for c <
y





F(¼)d¼ > (1 ¡ ¼¤¤)(¼¤¤ ¡ c) > 0 and @¼¤¤
@°t > 0 as well.
29Since F is strictly increasing, clearly
1 R
¼¤¤
F(¼)d¼ > F(¼¤¤)(1 ¡ ¼¤¤) holds. Therefore, given
that @¼¤¤











































































: Given that ° ¸ 1¡
y
¯x or ° +
y
¯x ¸ 1 at











y > 1: For a uniform distribution, the law of
motion for °t must therefore cross the 45± line from below at every steady state. This implies that
there is exactly one steady state, which we will denote by °d and that this steady state is in the open
interval (°b;°a): The steady state is globally unstable, and all nonstationary trajectories eventually
leave the feasible region. Hence the steady state is the only equilibrium in this economy.
30REFEREE’S APPENDIX A: DERIV ATION OF EQUATION ((8))
























































































¤) + °t ¡ °tF (¼
¤):






¼f (¼)d¼ = °tF (¼
¤) + °t ¡ °tF (¼
¤) = °t (36)
This can be written in another form by noting that
d
dx
[xF (x)] = F (x) + xf (x); (37)


































Substituting this into equation (36) yields the solution presented in equation (8).
REFEREE’S APPENDIX B: DERIV ATION OF EQUATION (20)


































































































































pt+1 + rd + °t
#
¼
¤¤[1 ¡ F (¼
¤¤)] + °t[F (¼
¤¤) ¡ F (¼
¤)]










¤) + °t[1 ¡ F (¼
¤¤)] + °tF (¼
¤¤) ¡ °tF (¼
¤)















































Substituting this into equation (38) yields the solution presented in equation (20).
REFEREE’S APPENDIX C: DERIV ATION OF EQUATION (26)




















(1 ¡ ¼)f(¼)d¼: (39)





































(1 ¡ ¼)f(¼)d¼: (40)






















































°t(1 ¡ ¼¤¤) + c
(1 ¡ °t)
:











Multiplying (43) (1 ¡ °t) and rearranging terms yields
1 ¡ °t =
·





Clearly, this reduces to (26).
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